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“NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL NOR YET GOOD
RED HERRING”
Joint Institutions, Single-Service Priorities, and Amphibious
Capabilities in Postwar Britain
Ian Speller

I

n December 1948, the U.S. Marine Corps Gazette published an article by Lieutenant Colonel Rathvon M. Tompkins, who reported on British policy on and organization for combined operations, the term the British used at the time to describe
amphibious operations.1 Tompkins was a U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) veteran of
landings at Tarawa and Saipan during the Second World War and had just completed a period working with the British at their School of Combined Operations
in North Devon.2 He praised them for their development of amphibious techniques during the war, but was less than complimentary about their postwar structures. In particular, he was critical of the “joint” (interservice) nature of the Combined Operations Organization, stating that “[b]elonging to no one in particular
and belonging to everyone in general, it is neither fish nor fowl nor yet good red
herring.” Reflecting on the lack of priority given to amphibious operations, Tompkins argued that, as it was not “squarely the responsibility of any one service,” the
subject tended to “take on the aspects of an orphan
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specifically the Royal Marines, primary responsibility for amphibious warfare. In
contrast, British policy consistently had emphasized the importance of joint approaches and joint structures or institutions in one form or another.
In the years immediately before the war, interservice activity in this field was
enabled by work at the staff colleges, by joint committees, and at a small joint
training and development center. Next, wartime requirements saw the establishment of an entirely independent joint organization, with responsibility for
amphibious policy, training, and development and the conduct of minor raids.
Major operations remained the responsibility of the established services, relying
on nonspecialist forces. This system survived the end of the war and the independent organization endured, in truncated form, until the early 1960s. At that
point, the existing institutions were absorbed into a wider “joint warfare” structure, losing their independent status. In some respects, the result was a return to
the prewar system, with interservice coordination achieved through joint committees and a small joint-training establishment. However, the Royal Marines
now were identified as the “parent arm” for amphibious warfare, giving the naval
service primacy in a role that previously had been considered entirely joint. This
represented an important break from previous practice.4
This article explores institutional responsibility for amphibious warfare from
the late 1930s until the reforms of the 1960s. It will argue that a joint approach
served British needs during the Second World War but contributed to poor
results after 1945. British capabilities did not recover until amphibious warfare
became the particular responsibility of the naval service, lending credence to the
argument that Tompkins advanced. The key point is that joint imperatives tend to
prosper when they have the support of a powerful patron or when key furnishers
of support and material (usually the army, navy, or air force, or some combination
thereof) recognize the value of the service or capability provided and are willing
to make sacrifices to support it. This case study suggests that the most effective
way to promote the development of joint capabilities is to link these explicitly to
the self-interest of the key provider(s) and to build joint structures that encourage rather than inhibit this. These issues have wider relevance, and the article’s
conclusion explores them with reference to contemporary joint initiatives in the
United Kingdom (U.K.) and U.S. armed forces.
THE EMERGENCE OF JOINT INSTITUTIONS
It sometimes is argued that, discouraged by the failure at Gallipoli in 1915, the
British ignored amphibious warfare during the interwar period. This was not the
case. The army and navy both retained an interest in amphibious operations in
the 1920s and 1930s and some useful training and experimental work was undertaken, particularly at the staff colleges, which combined annually to conduct
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/7
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a joint exercise. Lack of funds and lack of priority meant that the results were
relatively modest, but practical exercises were conducted, doctrine was updated,
and prototype landing craft were built. In accordance with long-standing practice, amphibious operations were understood to be a joint responsibility, and
coordination among the services was achieved by employing joint committees
and through cooperation at the staff colleges. The idea of employing the Royal
Marines as a specialist amphibious force gained occasional backing within naval
circles but had little support elsewhere.5
In 1936, a subcommittee of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee was established to support interservice training, and this group (DCOS[IT]) also was
given responsibility for updating doctrine, in the form of the Manual of Combined Operations. The new manual, completed in 1938, addressed all forms of
“combined” (interservice) operations, although over half the text was devoted to
topics relating to amphibious operations.6 DCOS(IT) also proposed the creation
of what became the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre (ISTDC),
established at Fort Cumberland (Portsmouth) in 1938.7 The ISTDC was tasked
with training and development across the range of interservice operations, but
amphibious considerations quickly came to dominate its work.
The ISTDC was an overtly joint organization. Prior to its establishment the naval staff college had proposed an entirely different approach, in which a training
and development center would be built around a military force provided by the
Royal Marines and supported by joint assets “as requisite.” The notion was that
the navy and the marines would be given primary responsibility for amphibious
warfare and that joint cooperation would be maintained on that basis.8 These
ideas did not gain support from the other staff colleges or from DCOS(IT), despite the support of the deputy chief of the naval staff. The joint vision prevailed.9
The ISTDC had a small staff consisting of a naval commandant, one staff officer each from the army and air force, and a Royal Marines (RM) adjutant. It was
instructed to study all joint operations and not to focus primarily on amphibious
matters, in accordance with the prevailing view that combined operations encompassed any operation that the army, navy, or air force might have to conduct in
cooperation with another service.10 In the event, the ISTDC ended up devoting
much of its time to amphibious warfare. This reflected the sympathies of its first
commandant, Captain Loben E. H. Maund, Royal Navy (RN), who was enthusiastic about amphibious operations and was able to push the center’s focus in that
direction. However, his attempts to win for the ISTDC a role in planning such
operations proved unsuccessful.11
The ISTDC managed to do some good work before the war, particularly in
supporting the design and construction of a small number of new, modern landing craft. In this respect Britain was ahead of the United States.12 Unfortunately,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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amphibious capabilities were not accorded a high priority in prewar British defense planning. Lacking any obvious requirement for amphibious operations in
the war they expected to fight, the British naturally prioritized other capabilities
in an environment in which both time and money were desperately short. The
approach was logical, but it left Britain ill prepared to deal with the unexpected
realities of war. Lack of a dedicated amphibious force available at short notice
undermined the British response to the German invasion of Norway in April
1940. The absence of such a force made evacuation from Dunkirk more difficult
in May–June 1940, and it forced the army to leave all its supplies and equipment
on the beach. The fall of France brought a new requirement for raids to harass the
enemy coast and a need to prepare for the kind of large operations that eventually
might allow Allied armies to return to Europe, but Britain was not well placed to
perform either role in the summer of 1940.
THE COMBINED OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION
The story of the wartime Combined Operations Organization has been told
many times and will not be addressed in detail here.13 This new joint organization
began as a tiny directorate set up within the Admiralty in June 1940, safely under
the control of the navy. Within weeks, however, the prime minister intervened
and appointed Sir Roger Keyes as Director of Combined Operations. Keyes, an
old acquaintance of Churchill and veteran of operations at Gallipoli (1915) and
Zeebrugge (1918), was a retired admiral of the fleet and had been an outspoken
critic of the Admiralty’s conduct of the war to date. His appointment was not
popular with the Chiefs of Staff; the First Sea Lord was particularly aggrieved.
One of Keyes’s first steps was to relocate his command out of the Admiralty and
into a separate building in Whitehall, establishing Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) as an independent joint headquarters—a move that further
alienated the navy, which viewed the new organization with suspicion.14
Unfortunately, Keyes achieved rather little in his new role, lacking the tact, organizational skills, and intellect required for a position that naturally trespassed
on ground that other, more-powerful groups considered to be their concern.
He was replaced in October 1941 by the dynamic young naval officer Louis F.
Mountbatten, who was promoted from captain to commodore and given the title
of Adviser of Combined Operations.15
Mountbatten, like Keyes, had been chosen by Churchill rather than the Chiefs
of Staff. He rapidly expanded the staff of COHQ, from twenty-three individuals
under Keyes to around four hundred, drawn from all three services. He was at
pains to emphasize the interservice nature of the organization, particularly to
those within COHQ.16 Reportedly, he succeeded to the point where his staff “almost forgot the colour of their uniform.”17
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/7
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Like Keyes, Mountbatten sought to establish COHQ as an operational command
independent of the services and, like Keyes, he failed. COHQ was responsible for
planning minor raids employing special-service troops (i.e., commandos) but was
not responsible for the conduct of major operations, responsibility for which remained with the army, navy, and air force. COHQ’s key role remained the provision
of technical advice on all aspects of opposed landings, coordination of training policy, command of training institutions, study of tactical and technical developments,
and research and development (R&D) into new equipment and landing craft.18
The importance of amphibious warfare within British policy was reflected in
the March 1942 decision to promote Mountbatten to the acting rank of vice admiral and the honorary ranks of air marshal and lieutenant general (to reflect the
joint nature of his appointment). He was given the new title of Chief of Combined
Operations (CCO), and as such sat as a full member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee when major issues were discussed or when amphibious matters were on
the agenda—a major elevation in status. COHQ had a representative on the Joint
Planning Staff and a representative on the British Joint Services Mission in Washington. Mountbatten remained in this position until August 1943, by which time
COHQ had done much to develop British proficiency in amphibious operations.
Departing to take up his new position as Supreme Allied Commander Southeast
Asia, he was replaced as CCO by an army officer (and former commando leader),
Major General Robert E. Laycock, who remained in the post until 1947.19
From humble origins the Combined Operations Organization grew into
something that began to resemble a fourth service. At the top of the organization was CCO, who sat as a full member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee when
relevant issues were discussed. He presided over an independent, interservice
headquarters in London, and by 1942 was responsible for administering around
a dozen training and experimental establishments in the United Kingdom and for
providing advice to a similar number of training centers overseas.20 COHQ issued
advice on a vast range of topics relating to amphibious warfare and maintained
liaison with the United States to keep abreast of developments there. The arrival
of nine American officers in summer 1942 made COHQ one of the first joint
interallied headquarters in London. Combined Operations was also responsible
for training landing craft officers and crewmembers and for administering the
growing amphibious fleet. The Admiralty viewed this with concern, and in late
1942 moved to regain control of something that was beginning to resemble a
rival navy.21
Starting from a low base, British amphibious capabilities expanded dramatically, and amphibious operations evolved from a neglected art into a war-winning
instrument. In 1939, the ISTDC had reported that a shortage of landing craft
meant that Britain lacked the capacity to land even a brigade with less than six
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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months’ notice.22 By June 1944, the British were able to play the leading role in
the largest and most complex amphibious operation of all time; 70 percent of the
landing ships and craft employed during Operation NEPTUNE were RN vessels.23
Small-scale raids became the business of amphibious specialists (commandos)
but—as anticipated before the war—major operations were conducted largely
by conventional military forces, assisted by a joint organization created for this
purpose. Combined Operations played an important part in this, promoting
training, development, and the identification of new techniques and new equipment. It was aided, of course, by close collaboration with the United States.24 The
independent organization grew out of an immediate need—in an environment
in which amphibious forces were accorded a significant priority—and resources,
while never sufficient, were plentiful in comparison with the 1930s. The organization enjoyed the support and sponsorship of the prime minister, as evidenced
by his appointment of Keyes and promotion of Mountbatten—rather against the
wishes of the Admiralty.
COMBINED OPERATIONS AND AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AFTER 1945
The British established the principles that would govern the postwar organization for amphibious warfare in 1944, at around the same time as the Normandy
landings were taking place. It is not surprising, therefore, that they remained
wedded to established ideas about combined operations being a joint responsibility. Despite this, the navy continued to advocate an approach that would put
it in the driver’s seat. The Admiralty never had been reconciled entirely to the
establishment of COHQ as an independent headquarters, nor did it maintain an
easy relationship with either Keyes or Mountbatten, both of whom owed their
position to Churchill, not the sponsorship of the First Sea Lord. Laycock was a
less divisive character than either of his predecessors, but he often found himself
facing the Admiralty as an adversary rather than an ally.25
In May 1944, the First Sea Lord, Andrew B. Cunningham, advanced the notion that in the future the Royal Marines should become the main source of
amphibious advice and expertise and that they should be given responsibility
for the provision, training, and development of all special-assault forces. He
accepted the requirement to retain an interservice aspect to combined operations but believed that in the future CCO should be an RM officer acting with a
“divided responsibility.”26 In many respects, this was a return to the general idea
the navy had advanced before the war; joint liaison would be maintained, but
the Royal Marines (and therefore the navy) would take primary responsibility
for amphibious warfare. An interservice committee was set up to investigate the
matter, with Air Marshal Sir Norman H. Bottomley, the Deputy Chief of the Air
Staff, as chairperson.27
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/7
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The Bottomley Committee submitted its report to the Chiefs of Staff on 29
June 1944. The report emphasized that amphibious warfare had to be accepted
as a permanent commitment for the whole armed forces. This, the members argued, would require maintenance of the existing system, whereby CCO acted as
the central advisory body, while the individual services remained responsible for
the provision of equipment and personnel, and force commanders were responsible for actual operations. They recommended the maintenance of a permanent,
central, independent, interservice combined-operations organization, because
amphibious warfare, “whilst involving all three services, is the exclusive province
of no one of them.”28
The possibility of creating a specialist amphibious corps along the lines of the
USMC was investigated but was rejected as being uneconomical and ill suited to
British requirements. The committee thought primarily in terms of major operations such as the one so recently undertaken at Normandy. Under this model, a
specialist corps would not fit into the framework for postassault operations, which
would call for conventional military forces. Nor would the British be able to afford
to maintain a specialist force of the size required to conduct operations on the
scale envisaged. The report concluded that “[t]here is no escaping the conclusion
that the Army itself must be ready to find the assault force required in war.”29
The committee did consider the possibility of maintaining in peacetime a permanent amphibious brigade of Royal Marines, available at short notice for emergencies short of war, but, mirroring prewar assessments, it rejected the idea as
being of doubtful utility. However, it was proposed that the Royal Marines should
provide most of the personnel for a Special Service Group of 1,094 men, consisting of a headquarters, two commando units, and a Small Operations Group.
The main role of this group was to facilitate training and to act as a nucleus for
expansion in war, but it was acknowledged that it also might provide a small and
highly mobile unit for imperial defense, reflecting prewar ideas about the value
of a Royal Marines Striking Force.30
To maintain proficiency in amphibious warfare, the committee argued for
the retention of the post of CCO and of COHQ as the central advisory body. It
also called for the establishment of a permanent training organization designed
to keep the armed forces as a whole competent in the practice of amphibious
warfare, and for the maintenance of a Naval Assault Force. The latter (consisting
of sixty-four ships, 135 major craft, and 256 minor craft) would support training
and act as the nucleus about which to expand in any future war. A portion of the
force would need to be kept available permanently, but the majority would be
manned only during the annual training season.31
Admiral Cunningham was not happy with these conclusions. He considered
the Naval Assault Force to be too large, arguing that establishing a force of such
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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size would prejudice the maintenance of the postwar fleet. More fundamentally, the committee had rejected his proposal to make amphibious warfare the
particular responsibility of the Royal Marines, thereby leaving responsibility in
the hands of an independent interservice organization not subject to Admiralty
control. In response, he revived proposals made in 1943 to replace COHQ with
an interservice committee along the lines of the Joint Planning Staff.32
Cunningham was opposed on this point by the other chiefs and CCO. The
“Report by Committee on Inter-service Responsibility for Amphibious Warfare”
was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 29 July 1944.33 The armed
forces thus agreed to maintain after the war an independent joint organization
with responsibility for amphibious warfare; to set up institutions able to train
joint forces and to promote R&D; and, in principle, on the need to establish a
Naval Assault Force.
These plans did not long survive postwar austerity. The divisional-size lift envisaged for the Naval Assault Force soon was downgraded to brigade group–size
lift, and even then the Admiralty complained that it could not resource this without denuding the regular fleet of personnel. The Admiralty preferred something
more modest: at most, sufficient lift for a commando brigade, smaller than its
army equivalent and with fewer vehicles and supporting arms.34 It argued with
CCO and the army over the requirement, but the debate was largely academic.
Whatever the headline policy, only a handful of vessels was maintained in commission after the war, making large-scale or widespread training impossible. The
requirement eventually was reduced to the maintenance of sufficient lift for a
battalion group, and this finally was achieved in 1951 with the establishment at
Malta of the Amphibious Warfare Squadron (AWS).35
The failure to maintain a large training fleet undermined the aspiration to keep
the army as a whole conversant with amphibious operations. Similarly, ambitious
plans to maintain a major training establishment also failed. The large wartime
training centers were closed and were not replaced. In the event, only a small
Combined Operations School and a Combined Operations Signals School were
retained to develop and teach the techniques of amphibious warfare, supported
by the Combined Operations Experimental Establishment, which undertook
R&D work. For reasons of efficiency and cost, these were brought together—in
1949, at Fremington in North Devon—to form the Combined Operations Centre
(from 1951 known as the Amphibious Warfare Centre). The center did some
useful work, despite Tompkins’s criticism that its approach confined amphibious
warfare to an academic niche from which it was “removed annually, for a few
days at a time, to satisfy a requirement in a staff college syllabus.”36 The center at
least did maintain a fruitful relationship with the USMC, hence Tompkins’s spell
in North Devon.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/7
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Army interest in amphibious warfare was reflected in Exercise SPEARHEAD,
a major joint exercise conducted at the Staff College at Camberley in May 1947.
In addition, during the postwar years the army provided COHQ and CCO with
much-needed support in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, frustrating numerous
attempts by the Admiralty to downgrade or abolish the organization. In some respects, it was easy for the army to support COHQ—it cost it little to do so. However, the army’s interest did not extend to maintaining the army commando units
that were raised during the war, nor did it translate into regular or systematic
training for army formations. Joint amphibious exercises did occur, but tended to
be small-scale and rather ad hoc, much as they had been before the war.37
The Royal Marines retained three battalion-size commandos, organized into 3
Commando Brigade, and these undertook commando training at the Commando School, Royal Marines (based first at Towyn, then Bickleigh, later Lympstone).
In 1948, the Amphibious School, Royal Marines was set up to train landing-craft
crewmembers, and the school also absorbed several joint combined-operations
units that were too small to administer themselves.38
Apart from a small number of combined-operations specialists, the Royal
Marines were the only British troops to receive anything like regular amphibious
training, although even they were unable to focus on this role as much as they
might have wished. Commando units often were employed ashore in imperial
policing or counterinsurgency duties, reducing their availability to perform their
amphibious role. When the British agreed to send a commando unit to Korea to
assist the United Nations in 1950, they had to raise a new unit, 41 (Independent)
Commando, from volunteers and from a draft of reinforcements that had been
due to be sent to Malaya, where 3 Commando Brigade was being employed
ashore to chase Communist insurgents. The marines of 41 Commando undertook a number of successful raids behind North Korean lines and participated in
the epic action with U.S. Marines around the Chosin Reservoir and in the retreat
to Hungnam, earning a Presidential Unit Citation in the process. That they did
so with American equipment; carrying American weapons; and landed from
American ships, craft, and submarines may say something about the state of British preparedness for amphibious operations in 1950.39
Lack of priority was particularly apparent with reference to the amphibious fleet. Despite the return to the United States of Lend-Lease vessels and the
scrapping of hundreds of worn-out craft, the British still had many amphibious
ships and craft available at the end of the war. However, shortage of finance and
manpower made the navy reluctant to keep many of these in commission, and
most quietly rotted away in low-priority reserve. Vessels built to wartime standards and designed to meet wartime contingencies were beginning to show their
design limitations by the 1950s, and many were becoming rather dilapidated.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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COHQ pressed for new construction to replace these, and also for new ships to
fill the gaps that existed within the fleet (particularly with respect to fire-support
and infantry-assault vessels).40 The Admiralty successfully resisted such pressure
and, with the exception of a handful of minor craft, no new amphibious ships or
craft were built before the 1960s.41
The key problem was that, while lip service was given to the notion that amphibious warfare was important, it was not as important as other, more-pressing
concerns. The army was keen to retain expertise in amphibious operations, but
the cost of doing this fell largely on the navy. The admirals had other things to
worry about and preferred to prioritize more-traditional sea-control tasks. CCO
could advance the cause of amphibious warfare in the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and did so, but he was not well placed to force any of the services to devote
scarce resources to the matter. The prevailing concept remained for amphibious
operations on a similar model to Normandy in 1944. It was clear that such operations could not occur in the early stages of any war against the Soviet Union,
when once again survival might be the major issue. If they were required only
in the later stages, then the immediate need was for developmental work to keep
techniques up to date and for a small cadre to provide a basis on which to expand
after mobilization. Raiding might be needed in the early stages of war, although
even here lack of priority meant that equipment, training, and personnel were
recognized to be inadequate to meet planned requirements.42
In some respects, the overall approach was logical enough, given the type of
war that Britain expected to fight. Once again, however, the British armed forces
neglected to recognize the potential for amphibious forces to provide the ability
to deal with the unexpected. Failure to maintain in peacetime a credible amphibious force made it harder for Britain to respond effectively to several crises
beyond Europe, as was evident in the case of Korea. A shortage of appropriate
ships available at short notice undermined British planning during the Abadan
crisis in 1951.43 It complicated planning for reinforcement of the Suez Canal zone
in the event of major trouble in the early 1950s. And, most seriously, it badly undermined the British response to Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal in
July 1956.44 Humiliation at Suez helped to illustrate the shortcomings in Britain’s
amphibious capability, notwithstanding the innovative use of helicopters to land
marines on the beach at Port Said in November.
The navy’s attitude to the independent Combined Operations Organization
always had been, at best, ambivalent. Its leaders did not appreciate being harassed and held to account by CCO on matters relating to amphibious warfare
when they lacked sufficient resources to support roles to which they accorded a
much higher priority. In the period between 1944 and 1954, the Admiralty made
repeated attempts to undermine COHQ’s independence, reduce its staff, or have
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/7
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it abolished entirely. The Chiefs of Staff discussed the matter numerous times.
Army support for Combined Operations prevented the Admiralty from getting
its way but could not stop a steady reduction in staff and resources; by 1949, there
were just thirteen officers based at COHQ, and additional cuts followed.45 The
navy’s preferred approach was to amalgamate the post of CCO with that of the
Commandant General, Royal Marines (CGRM), but the prevailing concept of
amphibious operations as a joint responsibility within the context of major war
scenarios conspired to frustrate these plans.46
This all began to change in the 1950s as British military planning began to
reflect the implications of the emerging nuclear stalemate. There was growing
appreciation that a major war in Europe was now unlikely and, if it did occur,
probably would be characterized by an early and devastating nuclear exchange.
In such circumstances, the need for sustained, large-scale, conventional military
operations appeared doubtful. This posed challenges for all the services, but
especially the Royal Navy, whose primary role—sea control in a major European war—began to lose credibility. The wider availability of nuclear weapons
certainly posed problems for a concept of amphibious operations rooted in the
Normandy model. On the other hand, there was a growing understanding that
there was an increased likelihood of crises and conflicts beyond Europe, and the
navy began to explore the potential to use flexible maritime forces as a means of
responding to these.47
In July 1954, the Chiefs of Staff endorsed the conclusions of a joint working
party chaired by the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff. The joint working party argued
that the advent of the hydrogen bomb meant that the requirement for amphibious
operations in a major conflict now was limited to small-scale raids; operations
on a larger scale would have to be sponsored by the United States. Given this,
the requirement for training in peacetime could be limited to staff-level studies,
with exercises up to the strength of a reinforced battalion group. There was no
longer a requirement to keep the armed forces as a whole conversant with the
principles of amphibious operations. Now, for the first time, such operations
could become the primary responsibility of one group. The working party argued
that the interservice nature of the amphibious warfare organization should be
retained, but it concluded that the time was right for the Royal Marines to play
the “predominant part.” The members also recommended that the Amphibious
Warfare Centre should move from Fremington to amalgamate with the Amphibious School, Royal Marines at Poole. The Chiefs of Staff endorsed this move and
the conclusion that the Royal Marines should become the “parent body” for amphibious warfare. It was accepted that there was “no requirement for the Army
as a whole to be trained in amphibious warfare.”48 As a result, Amphibious Warfare Headquarters (AWHQ), as COHQ had been renamed in 1951, continued
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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to represent amphibious needs in Whitehall (with a reduced staff), and a Joint
Services Amphibious Warfare Centre (JSAWC) was created at Poole with the
amalgamation of the Amphibious Warfare Centre and the Amphibious School,
Royal Marines.49 Amphibious warfare remained a joint responsibility, but for the
first time the navy was in the driver’s seat.
Ten years earlier this might have caused a problem; the Admiralty had been
less than enthusiastic about amphibious operations. But by the mid-1950s things
were beginning to change. In a context in which major war in Europe appeared
unlikely, and any such war was expected to “go nuclear” in its early stages, the
navy’s focus on sea control in a third Battle of the Atlantic began to look less
than credible; the service was preparing for the wrong war. As a result, the navy
underwent a radical change in approach. Even before the 1956 Suez crisis, the
Admiralty had begun to think about the provision of flexible options for limited war and crisis management beyond Europe, and the failure of Operation
MUSKETEER reinforced the need for change. Within this context, amphibious
forces gained a new relevance within a broader expeditionary approach.
A DIFFERENT TYPE OF JOINTERY
From the late 1950s, the Admiralty embraced amphibious forces as a key element
within an expeditionary approach designed to provide Britain with flexible options for crisis management and limited-war contingencies beyond Europe. The
inherent mobility of amphibious forces had the advantage of reducing reliance on
a diminishing number of overseas bases and of providing access without the need
to negotiate overflight or basing rights. The utility of this was demonstrated on
numerous occasions, notably including the interventions in Kuwait (1961) and
East Africa (1964). The role also gave the navy a means of justifying retention of a
large, balanced fleet and could be mobilized to support the case for the next generation of large aircraft carriers. Thus—for the first time since the Second World
War—amphibious warfare became a major priority for the navy, in support of an
expeditionary strategy requiring balanced forces.50
To support its new expeditionary approach, the navy replaced the aging AWS
with two new assault ships (LPDs), commissioned in 1965 and 1967, and converted two light aircraft carriers into landing platform helicopter (LPH)–style “commando carriers” in 1960 and 1962. Six new logistic landing ships (LSLs) were
built to carry follow-on forces and provide logistic lift for the army in peacetime.
Operated initially by the British India Steam Navigation Company on behalf of
the Ministry of Transport, the LSLs transferred to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in
1970. This new capability was designed to carry, land, and sustain in combat a
balanced army brigade group; it was not intended only for marines. The commandos could provide a very useful light “fire brigade” designed to deal quickly
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/7

12

Speller: “Neither Fish nor Fowl nor Yet Good Red Herring”—Joint Institutio

SPELLER

97

with minor conflagrations, but British policy was built on the idea that larger and
more heavily equipped forces might be required in some circumstances. Thus,
the LPDs and LSLs were designed specifically to carry and land the full range of
army equipment, including tanks. They were to be part of a joint capability that
the navy dubbed the Joint Services Seaborne Force.51
Nonetheless, this was all good for the Royal Marines. The Commando Brigade
expanded from three to five active battalion-size commandos. (Plans to raise a
sixth were dropped quietly owing to fear of opposition from the army.)52 From
1962 the commandos were reinforced with 105 mm pack howitzers, provided by
the Royal Artillery, further enhancing the offensive potential of the commando /
commando carrier combination and reflecting the evolution toward an expeditionary role, as distinct from their previous rationale of wartime raiding.53 It
should be stressed that, despite these additions, 3 Commando Brigade was an RM
unit with joint elements attached—it remained firmly within the naval service.
The Admiralty rejected suggestions that the army routinely should contribute
infantry battalions to the Commando Brigade, and that command of the brigade
should rotate between the army and the marines, accurately surmising that these
reflected gambits designed to protect army regiments from cuts rather than any
serious or sustained interest in amphibious operations. It was not difficult to
show that rotating line battalions through the brigade was a poor substitute for
the employment of well-trained amphibious specialists, although this did not
stop army battalions from working with the brigade, as they did during the 1982
Falklands War.54
The 1958 edition of the Naval War Manual noted only two forms of amphibious operations, raids and invasions, and both within a major war context.55 But
by the time the edition was published, it already was apparent that Britain required a new concept of operations, one that focused less on tip-and-run raids or
ponderous, large-scale assaults against defended beaches, but instead promoted
enhanced range and mobility and greater responsiveness within a limited war
context. The matter was explored in detail by AWHQ and by the Land/Air Warfare Committee, the two bodies responsible for amphibious and for airborne
techniques. This led to the development of the “seaborne/airborne concept,”
which was studied and refined in collaboration between these two organizations
and the Staff Training Unit at the JSAWC and the School of Land/Air Warfare
at Old Sarum (Wiltshire). The concept sought to exploit the complementary
strengths of seaborne and airborne forces to enable a rapid and flexible approach
to expeditionary operations overseas, with the idea that a light but adaptable
force immediately available might be more effective than larger forces requiring
a longer timescale. It represented a major departure from the traditional (1940sstyle) amphibious operations envisaged to that point. Amphibious forces now
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were to be viewed as being part of a single team that also included airborne and
air-transported elements.56
Under this new concept, seaborne and airborne forces were to cooperate in
a seamless manner. Given this, it made little sense to divide responsibility for
developing the concept between separate amphibious and land/air organizations; a new institutional structure was needed. A new Joint Warfare Committee
(JWC) was established in January 1962, replacing both AWHQ and the Land/Air
Warfare Committee. It reflected the latter more than the former, as it was not an
independent headquarters but rather an interservice committee responsible to
the services via the chiefs. The JWC met ten times in its first year, chaired by the
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, with individual representatives from each service and the Director of the Joint Warfare Staff (see below).57 Additional members
were co-opted as required.58
The JWC had three subcommittees, dealing with offensive support, airtransport support, and amphibious warfare. The first two reflected the focus of
the two main wings of the old School of Land/Air Warfare.59 The Amphibious
Warfare Sub-Committee was responsible for providing advice and recommendations on policy, techniques, tactical developments, and training for amphibious
operations. It also was to advise on the collection of intelligence required for
amphibious operations and to ensure standardization and compatibility of equipment. Its remit was narrower than that of AWHQ, and responsibility for matters
such as amphibious equipment and logistics was given to the services; for practical reasons, this fell largely on the navy.60
The JWC was supported by a small interservice secretariat, known as the Joint
Warfare Staff (JWS). This consisted of a two-star director, a one-star deputy, and
ten other officers drawn from the three services. The first director was Major
General Robert D. “Titch” Houghton, RM, who had been the last Chief of Amphibious Warfare (the Chief of Combined Operations had adopted this new title
in 1951). His new role lacked the direct access to the Chiefs of Staff that had been
a feature of his previous post. Instead he was to submit an annual report to the
JWC, which would forward it to the chiefs for consideration. The JWS inherited
AWHQ’s location and its staff and adopted the old Combined Operations badge;
it was, however, a very different type of organization. It had a much broader remit
than had AWHQ, having also to address wider issues relating to joint warfare.61
The inevitable result was that it could devote less time to consideration of amphibious warfare than had the previous organization.
An important role for the JWS and JWC was the production of doctrine, in
the form of a Manual of Joint Warfare, building on the principles outlined in
the seaborne/airborne concept. The first edition was issued in February 1964.
It focused on all aspects of nonnuclear joint warfare beyond Europe. The topic
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of amphibious operations was addressed in volume 4 of the manual, which emphasized that such operations were essentially joint in nature. The manual was
revised three times in the 1960s, with updated versions released in 1965, 1967,
and 1970. By the time the last version was issued it no longer focused on nonnuclear options beyond Europe but instead covered all aspects of joint warfare.
It reflected the growing reemphasis within British defense policy on war fighting
within the NATO region.62
In addition to the above, the Staff Training Unit of the JSAWC and the School
of Land/Air Warfare were brought together to create a new Joint Warfare Establishment (JWE) at Old Sarum. This was responsible for formulating and teaching the tactical doctrine, procedures, and techniques required for joint warfare.
The Royal Marines retained an Amphibious Training Unit and a Trials Section
at Poole, where they continued to undertake amphibious training—a task more
readily conducted there than at the JWE, which was situated thirty miles inland.
The Chief of the Air Staff wanted the JWE always to have a Royal Air Force (RAF)
officer as director, clearly believing that airpower issues predominated. However,
neither the army nor the navy supported him in this matter, and the directorship
rotated among the services.63
The JWE concentrated initially on training and the development of doctrine
designed to support the type of expeditionary operations envisaged in the seaborne/airborne concept. However, it later expanded its scope to all forms of joint
warfare, particularly as, by the early 1970s, British defense policy once again was
focused heavily on the NATO region and the conduct of expeditionary operations began to be regarded as an unlikely requirement. The bread and butter of
the JWE was a two-week Joint Warfare Course that focused on the conduct of
conventional joint operations.64 The JWE ran a number of other courses, including an Amphibious Warfare Planning Course, but amphibious operations were
never its primary focus.
Christian Liles has emphasized that these new structures reflected the longestablished British preference for a joint approach to amphibious operations. He
argues that attitudes toward amphibious warfare reflected those that had existed
in the 1930s, when the approach had focused on combined operations more generally, not solely on amphibious warfare. Thus, he notes, the remit of the ISTDC
was similar to that of the new JWE, with its focus on air, land, and maritime
cooperation. The new Manual of Joint Warfare covered much more than just
amphibious warfare, as had the 1938 Manual of Combined Operations.65
It is true that the British continued to identify amphibious operations as being
a joint responsibility. There was no suggestion that amphibious operations were
the sole preserve of the navy and the marines. This was evident in the institutional
structure described above and in the new Manual of Joint Warfare. It was reflected
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in the design of the new amphibious ships constructed during the 1960s, which
were built to accommodate a balanced military force, including the full range of
army equipment. The Commando Brigade—the unit most likely to be at the forefront of any amphibious operation—had joint forces attached. The joint approach
also was apparent in the Admiralty’s vision for expeditionary operations in the
early 1960s, the aptly named Joint Services Seaborne Force. However, the decision
to make the naval service the “parent arm” for amphibious warfare represented
an important change in policy and practice, with broadly positive consequences.
It became apparent to the Admiralty that the new joint institutions were neither staffed nor organized to do the work that AWHQ had done formerly, and
that therefore, “in the absence of a joint organisation,” additional responsibilities
relating to policy and development now would fall on the Admiralty itself.66 The
Director of Tactical and Weapons Policy, restyled the Director of Naval and Tactical Weapons Policy from 1965, became responsible for amphibious warfare and
for the coordination of joint-warfare matters, and he sought additional staff to
help carry the weight. He was advised by the CGRM on the military aspects of
amphibious warfare and on all matters pertaining to the Royal Marines.67
In a practical sense, amphibious training and development centered on the
navy’s amphibious ships and the Royal Marine commandos. In 1965, the AWS
changed its base from Bahrain to Singapore, prompting the Commander-inChief, Far East Fleet to request that a commodore be appointed to command
these ships, promote amphibious training and development, and work with
the commander of 3 Commando Brigade. This resulted in the appointment of
Hardress “Harpy” Lloyd as Commodore Amphibious Forces, Far East Fleet in
May 1965.68 The post was relocated to the United Kingdom in 1971, with the
Commodore Amphibious Warfare (COMAW) now responsible to the two-star
Flag Officer, Carriers and Amphibious Ships.69 In the years ahead, COMAW
and his staff would represent the main repository of expertise in amphibious
operations within the Royal Navy. The only military force to undertake regular
training and exercises in such operations, and to work closely with COMAW, was
3 Commando Brigade. The institutional structure and latest doctrine may have
stressed the joint nature of amphibious operations, but in most practical senses
expertise in amphibious warfare was limited to those wearing dark blue uniforms
and those in green berets.70
The reorganization of the early 1960s was initiated at a time when expeditionary operations were emphasized within British defense policy and when there
was interest in enhancing joint cooperation within the Ministry of Defence. This
was evident in the reform of that ministry in 1964 and the adoption of unified
(joint) commands in the Middle East (1959), Near East (1961), and Far East
(1962).71 By the end of the decade, things had begun to change. The refocus on
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Europe that accompanied the British withdrawal from “East of Suez” was characterized by growing doubts about the need for expeditionary capabilities and by
the services retreating toward what were seen as core roles. Those roles tended to
revolve around single-service priorities. As Admiral Sir Jonathon Band recalled,
“The 1970s heralded the start of a bleak period for jointery.”72 The unified commands were abandoned and command and control was subsumed within NATO
structures. The JWE was disbanded in 1979 and incorporated (with reduced
staff) into the National Defence College at Latimer, as the new Joint Warfare
Wing. Two years later it was decided to close this wing entirely—a decision reversed only after the Falklands War demonstrated the value of joint operations.73
The change in policy meant that amphibious forces were confined, once again,
to the periphery of British defense interest. In the 1970s, the Commando Brigade
contracted back to three commando units, and the two commando carriers were
decommissioned without replacement. In 1975, replacements for the LPDs were
removed from the Ministry of Defence Long Term Costings, and by 1981 existing
ships appeared under threat within the context of a defense review that sought to
force the navy to focus ever more narrowly on sea control in the eastern Atlantic.74 Perhaps typically, Major General Julian H. A. Thompson, RM, recalled that
as a student at the joint Royal College of Defence Studies (1979–80) he submitted
a paper on expeditionary warfare that was sent to the Ministry of Defence for
comment. It was returned with the suggestion that he had wasted his time; such
operations never would happen again.75 Two years later, Thompson commanded
3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands War, in a campaign that included a
brigade-level amphibious landing at San Carlos. Success there rested on the aging remains of the 1960s amphibious force and on the expertise possessed by the
Royal Marines and by COMAW (Commodore Michael C. “Mike” Clapp) and his
staff. This expertise was not evident in other elements of the joint force.76
The Falklands War did not lead to an immediate change in overall British
defense policy. Joint warfare and expeditionary operations did not regain their
prominence in British defense planning until the end of the Cold War brought yet
another reversal of defense priorities. The ensuing decade brought the rejuvenation of Britain’s aging amphibious fleet, and the navy once again emphasized the
value of amphibious forces and aircraft carriers as a means of projecting power
overseas. Joint warfare emerged from the shadows to become a key issue. The
result was the formation of a joint operational command, joint logistics organization, joint doctrine and concepts center, and joint staff college to replace the
single-service alternatives.77 Amphibious warfare remained a joint concern and
involved joint forces, but the Royal Navy and Royal Marines were clearly the
parent arms. This was reflected in the confidential 1997 publication The United
Kingdom Approach to Amphibious Operations, produced in collaboration between
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the Headquarters Royal Marines and the Royal Navy’s Maritime Warfare Centre.78
The latter was responsible for delivering a short Amphibious Planning Course,
once the responsibility of the JWE.79 The only course at the new joint staff college that focused explicitly on amphibious operations, the Advanced Amphibious
Warfare Course, was provided for Royal Marines officers.80 Operational responsibility for amphibious forces was vested in Commander, Amphibious Task Group
(a naval officer) and Commander, U.K. Amphibious Forces (a Royal Marine).
SUMMARY TO THE 1960s
Throughout the period covered by this article, the British viewed amphibious
operations as an activity involving joint forces. However, what this meant in
practice changed over time.
Immediately before the war, amphibious operations were considered within
a concept of combined operations that encompassed all forms of interservice
activity. Naval attempts to gain prime responsibility for amphibious warfare were
not successful.
The events of 1940 gave amphibious operations a new priority, as complex,
large-scale operations became a necessary precursor to eventual victory. To equip
themselves for this unexpected task, the British created a new, thoroughly joint
organization that developed a thoroughly joint approach. Amphibious operations
were the business of all three services, and major operations were conducted by
conventional forces, not a dedicated amphibious corps. Training and the development of equipment and doctrine were in the hands of an independent joint
organization, which also administered a number of combined-operations units
required for training, minor raids, or specialist tasks within major operations.
This model was retained at the end of the war, in the belief that the armed
forces as a whole had to be able to undertake amphibious operations and that this
was the best way to prepare to do so. Once again, attempts by the navy to take
primary responsibility (via the Royal Marines) were rejected. However, while the
joint model had worked well during the war—when amphibious warfare was a
high-priority task and COHQ enjoyed the patronage of the prime minister—it
was less successful after 1945. In the face of postwar austerity and ambivalence
on the part of the navy, British capabilities atrophied. COHQ could study, teach,
advise, and pressure, but it could not force the navy, or indeed the army and the
air force, to devote scarce resources to something they did not consider a priority. Moreover, the very existence of this independent organization appeared to
aggravate admirals, who did not appreciate being harassed by a junior partner
over something they felt should be the business of the navy.
That situation did not change until the navy found a role for amphibious forces
within an expeditionary strategy that could be used to justify the maintenance
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of a balanced fleet. This was associated with the change in the accepted model
for amphibious operations and an acceptance that, while amphibious operations
would retain a joint element, the Royal Marines and the Royal Navy would play
the predominant part. Fortuitously, this put the navy in control at the same time it
discovered a new self-interest in developing this role. A joint-service element was
retained, but amphibious warfare became what the admirals had argued consistently it should be: the primary concern of the navy and the marines, supported
by joint forces as required.
It is important to note that the joint institutions created in the 1960s were
very different from those that had gone before. In his semiofficial history of the
Combined Operations Organization, Brigadier Bernard E. Fergusson, British
army (Ret.), explained the difference as follows: “There is all the difference in
the world between an inter-service meeting, however amiable and co-operative,
from which all hands afterward return to their respective bases; and a combined
[i.e., joint] headquarters, where all hands live together, use the same washbasins,
and owe allegiance to a single chief.”81 The approach from 1940 forward was for a
joint organization independent of the army, navy, and air force. In theory at least,
those involved forgot the color of their uniforms and reflected the interests of
“combined operations” above those of their parent services. All involved pulled
in the same direction, under the authority of the Chief of Combined Operations.
As Fergusson put it, “You cannot paddle your own canoe when you are all in the
same boat.”82 It was a highly evolved form of jointery.
In the 1960s, this changed to an approach based on joint cooperation and collaboration, enabled by a joint committee, secretariat, and training establishment.
The new structure, founded on consensus among service representatives, put
control back in the hands of the army, navy, and air force. Members of the JWC
were representatives of their own services; they were no longer in the same boat,
and they paddled their own canoes. This was a less-evolved form of jointery, but
it produced better results. The joint institutions promoted thinking about joint
warfare and included within their remit the development and promulgation of
doctrine for amphibious operations. By design, they devoted less time and attention specifically to this subject than had AWHQ. This did not matter, as the
navy (and marines) had picked up the baton. From the mid-1950s onward, amphibious warfare was predominantly a naval-service responsibility, and the naval
service—unlike AWHQ—had the power to turn interest into action.
MORE-RECENT APPLICATIONS
The historical case study illustrates the difficulty faced by a joint organization
tasked with maintaining proficiency in a role to which the main provider (in
this case, the navy) does not accord a high priority. It is not difficult to find other
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examples of the same dynamic in action. Within the British context, the fate of
fixed-wing naval aviation within Joint Force Harrier (JFH) offers a cautionary tale.
JFH (known initially as Joint Force 2000) was established in April 2000. It
brought together the navy’s Sea Harrier FA2 and the RAF’s Harrier GR7/GR9
squadrons within a new joint structure, ultimately under the control of RAF
Strike Command. The approach was designed to create synergies and savings in
a situation in which both aircraft types operated from the navy’s three Invincibleclass aircraft carriers, the FA2s in an air-defense role and the GR7/GR9s for
ground attack.83 This case is not entirely analogous to the experience of the post1945 amphibious forces, as the structures were different, but the history of JFH
reveals the same central dynamic, in which joint approaches could not overcome
the entrenched and self-interested attitudes of a dominant service.
Within just two years of the establishment of JFH a decision was taken to
retire the navy’s Sea Harriers to prioritize limited resources toward the RAF Harriers, which were considered more valuable for the operations then envisaged.
The decision appears to have been taken against the wishes of the navy, whose
carriers (and thus the fleet) were left without a fixed-wing air-defense capability.
The decision was supported actively by the RAF and by the Deputy Chief of the
Defence Staff (Equipment), Air Vice-Marshal Sir Graham E. “Jock” Stirrup, who,
unusually for an airman, seemed confident in the ability of the navy’s surface-toair missiles to provide an appropriate alternative to fighter cover.84 Later, as (joint)
Chief of the Defence Staff, Stirrup also seems to have been instrumental in a decision during the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review to retire the entire
remaining Harrier force earlier than planned.85 Here the Harriers were offered
up as a cost-cutting sacrifice required to keep the RAF’s fleet of aging land-based
Tornado bombers in service for a few more years. The decision appears to have
been taken against naval advice and at the last minute, upon the personal intervention of Stirrup—who seems not to have forgotten the color of his uniform. It
left the navy with no fixed-wing aircraft able to fly from its carriers, contributing
to the early retirement of those vessels.86
RAF reluctance to divert scarce resources to naval aviation reflected a longstanding preference for land-based, fast jets over anything that operates from the
sea. The RAF desire to focus on established core roles, to the detriment of joint capabilities, may mirror the reluctance of the postwar Admiralty to divert resources
to amphibious forces in the years after 1945; both organizations felt they should
focus on other things, ones that reflected core service roles. It is not clear that any
type of joint institution could have changed this; the key requirement would have
been a parent organization able to recognize the importance of the joint capability.
The British currently are regenerating their fixed-wing carrier capability after an interregnum of almost ten years, with RAF and RN F-35B Lightning IIs
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operating from the two new Queen Elizabeth–class ships. The aircraft fall under
the control of a new joint organization, Lightning Force Headquarters, based
at RAF Marham, commanded by an RAF officer and under the control of RAF
No. 1 Group (the successor to Strike Command).87 This appears to be jointery
with one service in the ascendant. The analysis above suggests that this could be
a positive thing, provided the RAF recognizes the importance of this role and
identifies a self-interest in supporting it (as the Admiralty did with amphibious
operations in the late 1950s). Ongoing debates over whether Britain will supplement the initial buy of forty-eight F-35Bs with more of the same or, as many in
the RAF prefer, with F-35As unable to operate from British carriers may reveal
the extent to which joint imperatives can prevail.88 The history of RAF antipathy
toward carrier-based aviation does not promote optimism.
The contemporary U.S. armed forces have not adopted jointery to the same
degree as their British counterparts, although numerous joint initiatives have been
pursued since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The functional component commands (Cyber, Special Operations, Transportation, and Strategic Commands) provide an interesting example, as they came about because of the need
to coordinate joint elements and a fear that the parent services otherwise would
not devote enough attention to these areas. The similarity to COHQ is obvious;
however, differences also are apparent, most notably in terms of resources, power,
and status. The component commands are led by four-star officers—equal in rank
to the service chiefs. They have sizable budgets and access to Congress. They more
closely resemble the wartime COHQ at the height of its influence under Mountbatten than the neglected, truncated organization in existence after 1945.
Despite this, periodic conflict between these commands and the parent services is inevitable. Thus, for example, note the differences between U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and the U.S. Air Force over planned reductions
to the latter’s tanker fleet, with the commander of TRANSCOM (General Stephen
R. Lyons, USA) arguing against the Air Force position in front of the Senate
Armed Services Committee in early 2020.89 The established dynamic of a service
seeking to reduce emphasis on a joint capability so as to prioritize something else
is evident once again. Important differences here, compared with COHQ, are that
TRANSCOM is in a stronger position institutionally to advance its case, and also,
critically, that TRANSCOM provides a service that is recognized widely as important.90 Within this context, the joint approach has some chance of success and may
provide an important coordinating function akin to that of COHQ during the war.
This article has argued that joint imperatives prosper when they have the support of a powerful patron, or when key furnishers of support and material recognize the value of the service they provide and are willing to make sacrifices
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to maintain them. The most effective way to encourage this has been to link the
needs of the joint organization to the self-interest of the services.
The experience of COHQ shows that structures that work well in one context
(during a major war) may prove less advantageous once conditions and priorities
change (after the war). In the latter case, the situation for Combined Operations
might not have been so bad had it enjoyed the support and protection of a powerful Ministry of Defence, but the weakness of Britain’s central organization for
defense at that time, allied to severe resource constraints, militated against this.
With regard to responsibility for amphibious warfare, the analysis above appears to validate Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins’s assessment from the 1940s.
Amphibious capabilities were served best by a structure in which they became
the responsibility primarily of one service, and when that service recognized the
value in maintaining such capabilities. The American experience in this field,
both past and present, appears to reinforce that conclusion. In the United States,
proficiency in amphibious operations has been supported by the existence of a
powerful parent organization with a strong institutional imperative to focus on
such operations. The U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy have an impressive track
record in this respect—a case too well established to require further elaboration
here.91
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